“I honestly have no idea who would want to buy this for more than the price of a dilution refrigerator when they could get more and better qubits on the IBMQ systems, for way less money and heartache.”
Thanks for the shout out! Can we quote that on the marketing pages? (Just kidding.)
But seriously, this particular offering does seem a bit odd except perhaps in the context of what would be a slow-rolling parts liquidation.
I can think of a few people or States who might like to get their hands on one...will be interesting to see who the takers are in 2024 and what kind of volume this sort of deal supports.
That’s an interesting point. The USA has an abundance of QC cos, but there’s no way that CFIUS would allow a foreign company to buy a controlling stake in one (I hope!). Are QPUs not covered by export controls?
So outside of CFIUS and some other areas (e.g., no access to US-based quantum systems for certain countries), there isn't (yet) a systematic framework in place.
One of the issues in trying to do so is that quantum isn't a very standardized technology yet (unlike semiconductors), and the supply chains (or chokepoints more generally) aren't known. So how to balance the need to foster the industrial and academic ecosystems against the risks of bad actors and known cybersecurity risks is a challenge.
In addition, taking the kind(s) of frameworks used for semiconductors (e.g., manufacturing equipment and system/chip capabilities) and applying them to quantum may not make sense: again, we don't have mature supply chains, and it's not really well-known right now how to balance the benefits and potential risks of near-term systems. A further complicating factor is that advances in the underlying algorithms themselves bring closer to the present both benefits and risks.
So the whole thing seems pretty difficult to get a handle on in the abstract, but that shouldn't necessarily stop USG from trying. I am hopeful USG can/will find a prudent path forward on this.
Nice one! I think "outlive" tops my 2023 non-fiction list as well.
Regarding learning about the Israeli-Arab conflict, I recently listened to a very interesting EconTalk episode on the topic that I'm happy to recommend: https://www.econtalk.org/an-extraordinary-introduction-to-the-birth-of-israel-and-the-arab-israeli-conflict-with-haviv-rettig-gur/. The guest wrote a book entitled "Letters to my palestinian neighbor", which I haven't read, but I imagine it's excellent.
“I honestly have no idea who would want to buy this for more than the price of a dilution refrigerator when they could get more and better qubits on the IBMQ systems, for way less money and heartache.”
Thanks for the shout out! Can we quote that on the marketing pages? (Just kidding.)
But seriously, this particular offering does seem a bit odd except perhaps in the context of what would be a slow-rolling parts liquidation.
I can think of a few people or States who might like to get their hands on one...will be interesting to see who the takers are in 2024 and what kind of volume this sort of deal supports.
That’s an interesting point. The USA has an abundance of QC cos, but there’s no way that CFIUS would allow a foreign company to buy a controlling stake in one (I hope!). Are QPUs not covered by export controls?
Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer.
From what I've read, USG is still figuring out a framework for putting such export controls in place:
* https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/31/us-china-competition-quantum-computing/
* https://www.insidequantumtechnology.com/news-archive/will-national-security-concerns-obstruct-quantum-computer-finance/
* https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2023/06/current-technology-risks-assessed-by-us-government-regulatory-tools
So outside of CFIUS and some other areas (e.g., no access to US-based quantum systems for certain countries), there isn't (yet) a systematic framework in place.
One of the issues in trying to do so is that quantum isn't a very standardized technology yet (unlike semiconductors), and the supply chains (or chokepoints more generally) aren't known. So how to balance the need to foster the industrial and academic ecosystems against the risks of bad actors and known cybersecurity risks is a challenge.
In addition, taking the kind(s) of frameworks used for semiconductors (e.g., manufacturing equipment and system/chip capabilities) and applying them to quantum may not make sense: again, we don't have mature supply chains, and it's not really well-known right now how to balance the benefits and potential risks of near-term systems. A further complicating factor is that advances in the underlying algorithms themselves bring closer to the present both benefits and risks.
So the whole thing seems pretty difficult to get a handle on in the abstract, but that shouldn't necessarily stop USG from trying. I am hopeful USG can/will find a prudent path forward on this.